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AUTONOMOUS Vehicles rely on accurate and robustsensor observations for safety critical decision-making
in a variety of conditions. Fundamental building blocks of
such systems are sensors and classifiers that process ultra-
sound, RADAR, GPS, LiDAR and camera signals [1]. It
is of primary importance that the resulting decisions are
robust to perturbations, which can take the form of different
types of nuisances and data transformations, and can even be
adversarial perturbations (APs).
Adversarial perturbations are purposefully crafted alter-
ations of the environment or of the sensory measurements,
with the objective of attacking and defeating the autonomous
systems. A careful evaluation of the vulnerabilities of their
sensing system(s) is necessary in order to build and deploy
safer systems in the fast-evolving domain of AVs. To this end,
we survey the emerging field of sensing in adversarial settings:
after reviewing adversarial attacks on sensing modalities for
autonomous systems, we discuss countermeasures and present
future research directions.
I. ROBUST SENSING
The robustness of a decision system refers to its capability
of making the correct decision, even when testing conditions
are degraded. In particular, it is important that the decisions are
not changed when small perturbations alter the input signal.
The lack of robustness poses critical safety threats for AVs,
and it could even allow an attacker to design adversarial
perturbations that defeat their sensing systems.
In order to formalize the concept of APs, let fm be a
decision-making system (e.g., a classifier or detector) for a
sensing modality m, x an input signal of the same modality
belonging to a data distribution X , gv a function that applies
a perturbation v on the input signal x, and D a function that
measures the distortion between the input and the perturbed
signal. Then, v is called an AP, and consequently, gv(x) is an
adversarial attack that generates adversarial examples, if:
fm
(
gv(x)
) 6= fm(x),
subject to D(gv(x),x) < ,
gv(x) ∈ Φ,
(1)
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Fig. 1: The physical and on-signal adversarial attacks.
where Φ is the legitimate domain of the original signal x, and
 limits the distortion of the input signal. This limitation relates
to the most common definition of adversarial attacks, and
implies that the information of the sensed signal is not consid-
erably changed, or even destroyed, by an attack. For example,
it is common to control the distortion with the constraint
that the original (clean) and the adversarial signals should
be close enough in an `p-norm sense, ‖gv(x)− x‖p < .
While several adversarial methods focus on additive APs,
where gv(x) = x + v, the adversarial attack gv can be any
function that computes and applies a perturbation on a signal
(e.g., transformation-based APs).
In general, adversarial attacks can be physical or on-signal
(see Figure 1). Physical adversarial attacks are perturbations
that modify the environment in an adversarial manner, for
example, to mislead the interpretation of traffic signs [2]. Phys-
ical attacks can hide objects (i.e., causing false-negative de-
tections), generate observations of inexistent objects (i.e., pro-
ducing false-positive detections), induce misclassification of
detected objects, or counterfeit signals. Physical APs are gen-
erally constructed under transformation-based constraints, to
be invariant to transformations that take place when captured
in the physical world, such as the rotations, scaling, and
illumination variations that can occur in cameras, for example.
On-signal adversarial attacks modify the data captured by sen-
sors within the decision system. These attacks, which expose
the vulnerabilities of the classifiers or detectors, have been
mostly used to evaluate, understand, and improve decision
systems [3], [4], [5]. However, the ability to design an on-
signal attack implies that the attacker already has complete
access to the system and to the captured signal. As this
scenario relates to the (cyber-) security of the AV, it is out of
the scope of this article. An extensive overview of on-signal
attacks is provided in [6].
We focus now on physical attacks that alter the behavior
of AVs, exclusively by external actions. For example, attacks
that hide objects (jamming) may prevent AVs from detecting
pedestrians, or possibly cause a collision. Attacks that add ob-
2jects (spoofing) force AVs to detect inexistent objects, possibly
causing the AVs to suddenly stop. Misclassification attacks aim
to change the decision of a classifier, such as interpreting a stop
sign as speed limit sign, thus inducing wrong actions. Finally,
counterfeiting attacks mimic the properties of the original
signals with the aim of delivering adversarial measurements
to a sensor (e.g., delayed or wrong GPS signals).
We can distinguish attacks based on the means used by
the attackers. Physical adversarial attacks can be perpetrated
using devices, objects, or patches (see Figure 2). Devices
(e.g., a laser pointer) directly target the sensor. An adversarial
object, such as an adversarial traffic sign, can be constructed
to mislead a classifier, even if its appearance may be similar
to that of a benign object. Finally, a patch, such as a crafted
sticker, can be placed on objects in the environment to mislead
classifiers.
Next, depending on the attacker’s knowledge of the under-
lying system, attacks can be categorized as white, gray, or
black-box. In white-box settings, the attacker has complete
knowledge of the system (e.g., its architecture and parameters).
When machine learning models are used, the attacker also
knows the training data used to generate the model. In black-
box settings, the attacker has access only to the output of the
system. Finally, in gray-box settings, the attacker has only
partial information of the system, such as the architecture but
not the parameters or the training data, or the architecture and
the training data but not the parameters.
APs can also be categorized as data-specific or data-
agnostic. A data-specific AP is a perturbation v computed
for a specific signal x of a sensing modality [11], and it can
efficiently apply to that particular signal only (e.g., a spe-
cific stop sign). An attacker can also construct data-agnostic
APs, commonly referred to as universal APs [12], which are
applicable to any signal, ∀x ∼ X , of a specific modality.
An example here is a single perturbation for any street sign
that deceives a sensing system with high probability [2]. A
subset of data-agnostic perturbations, called class-universal,
are data-agnostic only for intra-class signals [13] (i.e., a single
perturbation for every stop sign); that is, ∀x ∼ Xc, where c is
the corresponding class. Data-agnostic and class-universal APs
are critical for the robustness of AVs, since a single AP added
to the physical world could potentially mislead any classifier of
a specific modality, thus posing a safety threat. This potential
threat derives from the fact that a strong property of data-
agnostic and class-universal APs is their transferability: APs
computed on a known model can also mislead an unknown
model [12].
In the next sections, we analyze physical adversarial attacks
and how they affect different sensors. We characterize each
attack based on its type, goal (Figure 3), data-dependency,
system knowledge, and evaluation. To evaluate the attacks,
we use the term attack success rate to denote the percentage
of adversarial examples that successfully mislead the system.
State-of-the-art methods are compared in Table I using the
proposed taxonomy.
II. ATTACKS USING DEVICES
In this section we discuss physical adversarial methods
that use devices to attack ultrasonic sensors, RADAR, GPS,
LiDAR and cameras.
A. Ultrasonic and RADAR sensors
Black-box and data-agnostic jamming and spoofing attacks
for both millimeter-wave radars and ultrasonic sensors aim
to hide or add objects in tasks such as automatic parking or
moving in reverse gear [7]. The jamming transducer generates
ultrasonic signals approximately around the sensor’s resonant
frequency. The jamming signal exceeds the sensor’s threshold
for the detection of returning echoes (it lowers the signal-to-
noise ration), and prevents the sensor from detecting a parked
vehicle. The spoofing attack must be executed in the interval
between the end of the transmitted pulse and the start of the
first echo; hence, the echoes are injected with a cycle time
that is several milliseconds shorter than the sensor’s. This
may cause unstable spoofed sensor readings, but it guarantees
successful injection in the attack slot. During parking, these
attacks lead to collisions, as objects are successfully hidden.
When AVs are moving in reverse gear, these attacks are
successful at a distance of up to 10 meters. However, these
methods are applicable only to slowly moving vehicles.
Black-box and data-agnostic attacks for ultrasonic sensors
also include random spoofing, adaptive spoofing, and jam-
ming [15]. These attacks aim to hide or add objects. Emitting
spoofed signals once every few milliseconds causes the AV
to stop moving as it detects inexistent objects. These false
positives can only be created at distances closer than the
distance between the spoofer device and the vehicle. To create
inexistent objects at an arbitrary yet stationary distance, the
adaptive spoofer pings a signal, listens and adjusts to the
concurrent sensor signals adaptively, eliminates the existing
echoes, and transmits the spoofed signal. Similarly to [7], the
jamming attack continuously emits ultrasound waves around
the resonant frequency of the sensors. Adaptive spoofing
can deceive the AV into detecting a nonexistent object at
any distance within the sensor range. Jamming prevents an
AV from detecting objects, thus potentially causing collisions
during automatic parking.
Finally, gray-box jamming and spoofing attacks can target
RADAR sensors to hide objects (i.e., generate false negatives)
or to add pseudo-objects (i.e., produce false positives) [7].
Using a signal analyzer to identify the center frequency of
the (known) radar sensor, an attacker can generate a jamming
waveform, the frequency of which is close to the center
frequency of the sensor, thus preventing the detection of
neighbouring vehicles. For the spoofing attack, the adversar-
ial signals are modulated as those of the automotive radar.
However, since the spoofing attack must be executed in the
interval between the end of the transmitted pulse and the start
of the first echo, the slope of the ramp is tuned back and
forth in a higher value range on the signal. This produces
periodic distance changes in the estimations that lead to false
identification of pseudo-objects. Similar to the attacks on
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Fig. 2: Examples of the three types of adversarial attacks: (a) with a spoofing device to hide objects from an ultrasonic
sensor [7], (b) with an adversarial object that is not detectable by LiDAR [8], and (c) with a patch on a traffic sign that causes
misclassification with cameras [2]. Images provided by the authors.
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Fig. 3: Examples of three objectives for adversarial attacks: (a) sign that is not visible by a camera (hidden object) [9], (b)
with a spoofing attack that adds nonexistent obstacles for LiDAR [10], and (c) with patches on a traffic sign that causes a
camera to misclassify the traffic sign [2]. Images provided by the authors.
ultrasonic sensors, these attacks are applicable only against
slowly moving vehicles.
B. GPS
Attacks on GPS sensors usually aim to counterfeit the
GNSS transmitted signals with an adversarial transmitter that
emits signals identical to those sent by the satellites, so that
the location computed by the GNSS receivers (i.e., GPS) is
incorrect. Such attacks are data-agnostic and, usually, white-
box, since the attacker must know the GNSS implementation
of the receivers and transmitters.
The most common adversarial techniques are spoofing and
replay attacks. An attacker must first transmit a sufficiently
powerful jamming GNSS signal to force the receivers to
lose their lock on the satellite. Then, the attacker can forge
and transmit spoof GNSS signals at the receivers’ antennas,
at the same frequency and with a higher power than those
of the legitimate GNSS signals. If the lock of the attacked
receivers on the spoofed signal persists, then the location
estimation is under the influence of the attacker. An attacker
can spoof a varying number of GPS receivers to any location,
while preserving their mutual time offsets. An analysis of
the requirements, architecture, and application of a receiver-
spoofing attack is given in [16].
Replay attacks can be characterized by the capability of
the adversarial node to receive, record, and replay GNSS
signals, and to the delay time between reception and re-
transmission [14]. Since the attacker can replay recorded sig-
nals with any additional delay, the receivers will start receiv-
ing the replayed navigation messages after some adversary-
specific signal propagation delay, which is usually negligible.
The delay, the most important feature, is used to control
the shift in the position, velocity, time (PVT) computation
by the receivers. The randomized replay attack can create
(in simulations) location offsets on the order of hundreds of
kilometers.
C. LiDAR
We can identify three types of attacks [10], namely
front/rear/side (the attacker is an adversarial vehicle that moves
close to the AV), roadside (the attacker installs malicious
devices on the roadside), and mechanic (the attacker has
limited time to place a malicious device on the AV). Relay
and spoofing data-agnostic and gray-box attacks can be used
to hide or to add objects. Note that these attacks assume that
the technical specifications and datasheets of the sensors are
publicly known. During the relay attack, the original signal
sent from the target vehicle LiDAR is relayed from another
4TABLE I: Physical adversarial attacks per sensing modality. KEY: H: hiding objects; A: adding objects; M: misclassifying
objects; C: counterfeit signal; DS: data-specific; CU: class-universal; DA: data-agnostic; WB: white-box; GB: gray-box; BB:
black-box; AVs: evaluation on autonomous vehicles settings. Note that [14] is evaluated only on simulations.
Sensor Reference Type Goal Data dependency Knowledge EvaluationDevice Object Patch H A M C DS CU DA WB GB BB Physical AVs
Ultrasonic [7] X X X X X X X[15] X X X X X X X
RADAR [7] X X X X X X
GPS [16] X X X X X[14] X X X X
LiDAR
[10] X X X X X X
[17] X X X X X X
[18] X X X X X
[8] X X X X X X X X X
Camera
[10] X X X X X
[7] X X X X X
[19] X X X X X
[11] X X X X X X
[20] X X X X X X
[2] X X X X X X X
[9] X X X X X X X X
[21] X X X X X
[13] X X X X X
[22] X X X X X
position to create fake echoes and make real objects appear
closer or farther than their actual locations. The spoofing attack
creates inexistent objects: the original signal is used as a
trigger to actively spoof the LiDAR sensor, with the intention
to relay or replay objects and control their positions. The relay
attack can hide objects that are 1 meter away, while generating
false-positive detections 20–50 meters away. The success of
the replay attack is limited when generating pseudo-points (on
the processed point-clouds generated by the LiDAR sensor)
closer than the attacker position. Spoofing attacks can also
make an object appear closer or farther away, even beyond
the range of the sensor, so that the actual object will not be
considered as an obstacle.
In contrast to the replay attack of [10], the white-box and
data-agnostic attack of [17] can add pseudo-points (i.e., false
positives) closer than the spoofer location. An adversarial
device receives the LIDAR pulse signal, adds the required
delay, and fires the delayed laser pulse back to the LiDAR
sensor. Moreover, a saturation attack can blind the sensors,
thus hiding objects by illuminating the LiDAR with a light
of the same wavelength as that of the sensor. A weak light
source produces randomly-located pseudo-points, whereas a
strong light source directed to the LiDAR completely blinds
the sensor or a part of its field of view. In addition, a strong
light source oblique to the LiDAR generates fake points in a
direction other than that of the light of source.
Finally, the adversarial robustness to spoofing attacks on
LiDAR sensors with deep neural network (DNN) detectors
is studied in [18]. A white-box and data-agnostic adversarial
attack can strategically control the fake points to fool the
machine learning model in the object detection step. The
method adds adversarial fake points at a specific location
(distance, altitude, azimuth) with respect to the LiDAR sensor,
with an attack success rate of 75% in generating front-near
false positives (5 meters in front of an AV). Note that, in
this case, all spoofed objects are detected as vehicles, even
though this was not in the specific objectives of the attack’s
formulation.
D. Camera
We can identify two types of gray-box and data-agnostic
attacks that emit light [10], namely, camera blinding and
auto control confusion. The blinding attack shines light on
the camera sensor, thus hiding any object within its field of
view. Blinding, which can be full or partial, occurs when the
camera is unable to tune down the auto-exposure or the gain,
thus generating over-exposed images. The effectiveness of the
blinding attack depends on the environmental light, the light
source used to blind (i.e., wavelength), and the distance be-
tween the adversarial light source and the camera. Experiments
in bright and dark environments with different light sources at
multiple distances show that 650 nm (red) lasers can efficiently
hide objects. Regarding auto control confusion, in which the
goal of the attack is to influence the auto-exposure control
of the camera, the attacker emits bursts of light toward the
camera, and, during the stabilization to the new environmental
conditions (typically between 1 and 6 seconds), the AV cannot
detect objects. The attacker continuously switches the light
on and off to confuse the auto controls, and, therefore, this
attack differs from situations in which the camera can adapt
more gradually to the new conditions, such as when driving
out of a tunnel. While the blinding attack could successfully
blind – in a simulated evaluation with low-quality images –
a widely used camera system at specific locations for up to
6 seconds when the attack is performed with burst lights from
a 50 cm distance, this attack is only effective within a limited
range (50-200 cm). Under similar settings as [10], the effect
of different light sources on hiding objects and other useful
visual information is studied in [7]. Although attacking with
infrared LED light does not affect the camera, laser beams
pointed directly to the camera cause complete blindness for
approximately 3 seconds.
5To summarize, adversarial attacks with devices can cause
significant problems in various tasks like automatic parking
(ultrasound, radar), obstacle detection (LiDAR), or capturing
of the surroundings (camera). However, they usually require
the hardware specifications of the individual sensors to be
known, while their effectiveness depends on the speed of the
vehicles, the range of the attack, and the precision of the used
devices.
III. ATTACKS WITH OBJECTS AND PATCHES
In this section, we discuss physical adversarial methods that
use objects and patches to attack LiDARs and cameras.
A. LiDAR attacks with physical objects
Adversarial methods can generate physical 3D adversarial
objects to mislead DNN-based LiDAR detection systems [8].
In the black-box settings, a data-specific evolutionary-based
attack is used to hide a generated adversarial object that is
placed in the environment. An iterative procedure is used
to generate the object: from an initial mesh of vertices, a
new population of vertices is generated at each iteration
step by adding random perturbations drawn from a Gaus-
sian distribution. However, when the object is placed in the
environment, low attack success rates are obtained. A data-
agnostic method to hide an object or to misclassify a detected
one is also proposed for white-box settings. The objective
of the method is to generate a synthetic adversarial object
by perturbing the vertices of an original one, such that the
AV system makes incorrect predictions. For synthesizing the
adversarial objects, a differentiable LiDAR renderer is first
simulated; the feature aggregation is, then, formulated with
a differentiable proxy function; and, finally, the smoothness
of the generated adversarial object is ensured by devising
different loss functions in the detection model. In white-box
settings, the hiding attack creates an adversarial object that
is not detected 71% of the time, while the misclassification
attack creates adversarial objects that are detected as another
class (e.g., pedestrian) with high confidence.
B. Camera attacks with physical objects
The first white-box method for generating adversarial ex-
amples to misclassify the decisions of an image classifier
even when transferred to the physical world was based on the
expectation over transformation (EoT) framework [19]. EoT
is used to construct APs that are robust to a set of physical
transformations, such as random rotation, translation, additive
noise, or 3D rendering of a texture. The generated 3D objects
remain adversarial even when changing the viewpoint, trans-
lation and rotation of the object, lighting conditions, camera
noise, and other physical world factors, with a classification
accuracy dropping from 68.8% to only 1.1%.
Adversarial traffic signs that cause misclassification can be
generated with an out-of-distribution attack or a lenticular
attack [11]. An out-of-distribution adversarial example can
be generated in white-box and data-specific settings, starting
from an arbitrary non-traffic-sign image (i.e., a fast food chain
logo), such that the arbitrary sign is classified as a traffic
sign with high confidence. The AP is forced to lie only on
the sign and not on the background, and to be invariant to
different transformations, such as rotation, shearing, resizing,
and randomized brightness. The lenticular attack relies on
an optical phenomenon to deceive traffic sign DNN-based
classifiers. The idea is based on the fact that the camera will
capture the images from a different height and angle than the
passengers within the vehicle; thus, the AP might be perceived
only from the camera’s angle but not from the passengers’
points of view.
A white-box, class-universal (universal for any stop sign),
object-based attack may target DNN-based classifiers by gen-
erating visual APs that are robust to different physical condi-
tions, such as different distance, viewpoint, illumination, and
rotation [2]. To ensure that such conditions exist in the image
samples, real images were collected from the road, while
synthetic ones were simulated using a set of transformations.
To guarantee that the perturbations are only applied to the
surface of the target object, a mask is used to project the
computed perturbations to a physical region on the surface of
the object (the road sign). In addition, the mask generates APs
that are visible but inconspicuous to human observers (i.e., the
mask looks like a graffiti). Also, since the position of the
mask has an impact on the effectiveness of the attack, sparsity
is enforced on the generated perturbations so that they are
concentrated on regions where the system is more vulnerable.
Finally, to account for fabrication errors, a term is added in the
objective function to model color reproduction inaccuracies of
the printing process. The generated adversarial stop signs were
evaluated on a vehicle, with an initial distance from the sign of
76 m, the speed of the vehicle varying up to 32 km/h, and the
vehicle moving toward the sign. For two classifiers trained
on different traffic sign datasets (achieving 91% and 95.7%
classification accuracy), their accuracies dropped to zero.
A white-box and class-universal attack can generate robust
physical APs against a DNN for object detection [20], in
the sense that the generated APs remain adversarial under
various physical condition changes (e.g., distance, angle). This
attack focuses on the region proposal stage of the detector,
which produces various candidate detection regions that are
fed into the classifier stage. The method simultaneously at-
tacks the classification within each proposed candidate region
by approximately maximizing, through backpropagation, the
classification adversarial loss for every proposed region. After
a forward pass on the region proposal network, the pruned
region proposals are treated as constants for the classification.
Then, the EoT framework is adopted for creating APs that
are robust to physical transformations. Finally, the generated
robust physical APs can be printed and applied on physical
stop signs. With the goal of misclassification at the corre-
sponding part of the model, the generated signs are printed
and placed in an indoor scene with such distance and angle
for mimicking driving conditions. When the attack aims at
a specific misclassification label, such as a person (targeted
attack), the success rate is 87%. When the attack does not
target a specific label (untargeted attack), the success rate
is 93%. The robustness of the untargeted attack is mostly
6affected by the distance increment, whereas the robustness of
the targeted attack is affected by the view angle. Although the
attack focuses on the classification task in a drive-by evaluation
(a vehicle approaches the sign from 60.9 meters away and with
a speed between 8 and 24 km/h), the adversarial examples are
also able to affect the detection. A clean stop sign is always
detected and classified correctly, but the adversarial signs, on
most occasions, are not detected; and when they are detected,
they are misclassified most of the time.
Finally, based on [2], an adversarial attack to object detec-
tors is proposed in [9] with the goal of hiding (preventing
the detection of) stop signs. By defining a loss function that
outputs the maximum probability of a stop sign occurring
within the scene, the extended white-box, and class-universal
method minimizes this probability until it falls below the
detection threshold of the classifier. The method is evaluated
indoors and outdoors, with recordings beginning at 9.1 meters
away from a stop sign and ending when the sign is outside
of the cameras field of view. The attack success rate is
85.6% indoors and 72.5% outdoors, and, when the adversarial
examples are evaluated on a different model, the attack success
rate (transferability) for the indoor case remains high at 85.9%,
while, for the outdoor case, it degrades and drops to 40.2%.
C. Camera attacks with patches
Physical adversarial methods may also use a specific sub-
category of objects, namely, patches, to attack cameras for
an image classification or an object detection task. A data-
agnostic, targeted adversarial attack can generate APs that
force a DNN to misclassify objects by localizing a single
perturbation on every image such that the resulting patch can
be printed and installed on objects [21]. The patch is the result
of training over a variety of images, where, to encourage the
trained patch to work regardless of the background, multiple
transformations based on the EoT framework are applied on
the patch in each image. Furthermore, an ensemble patch
method is used in which a single patch is jointly crafted across
five models. In simulated physical attacks (an adversarial patch
is added to the image but not printed), for patches occupying
only 10% of the image size, the single patch achieves an attack
success rate of around 89%, while the ensemble patch leads
to an attack success rate of around 95% (averaging across all
ensemble classifiers).
The patch-based method introduced in [2] (Section III),
follows the same approach as the object-based one, with
the difference that the AP is masked to take the form of
black-and-white patches that are placed on traffic signs. The
generated adversarial patches are evaluated on a vehicle with
two classifiers, with the vehicle moving toward the sign from
an initial distance from the sign of 76 meters at a speed varying
to up to 32 km/h. As the vehicle approaches the sign, the
accuracies of both classifiers show a significant drop.
A white-box and data-agnostic physical patch generation
method can add false-positive stop signs to the detector
output [9]. To this end, a composite loss function is used such
that it first creates a new object localization, followed by a
targeted misclassification. A state-of-the-art detector identifies
a nonexistent stop sign between 25% and 79% of the time
when these patches are placed on a clean wall, where no actual
stop sign exists, at 3 meters from the camera.
Unlike attacks that focus on targets with no-intra class
variety (i.e., only stop signs), target types with large intra-class
variety (persons) are considered in [13]. The loss function
to help hide people from detectors considers three factors,
namely, a non-printability score (how well the colors of a
patch can be reproduced by a printer); the total variation of
the image (favoring a patch with smooth color transitions);
and the maximum objectiveness score in the image (i.e., the
effectiveness on hiding a person), which aims to minimize
the object or class score output by the detector. Operating
in white-box settings and constraining the patch to lie in the
neighborhood of the predicted bounding boxes of persons, the
method is able to generate a class-universal adversarial patch
for hiding persons. This adversarial example patch decreases
the recall of the detector to 26.4% on a dataset of images in
which people were always detected in clean conditions.
Finally, a patch-based attack for object detectors can poten-
tially hide all of the objects to be detected in a scene without
overlapping with any of them [22]. The patch can be placed
anywhere in the field of view of the camera and cause all
objects to disappear, even if they are far from the patch itself.
This white-box and data-agnostic method generates the patch
by maximizing the loss for the original targets, given a set of
physical transformations that are applied on the patch using
the EoT framework. The patch can hide most of the objects
within the field of view: the mean average precision drops
from 40.9% to 7.2% when the patch is randomly placed. The
patch also disables the detection of objects that are moving,
as long as the patch itself is static with respect to the camera.
The patch is, to some extent, invariant to location, but it has
weaker influence on objects that are farther away.
Overall, adversarial attacks with objects pose a very serious
threat for AVs, in particular, for the common cases of attacking
LiDAR and camera sensors that use DNN-based classifiers and
detectors. These attacks can generate 3D adversarial objects
that are placed in the physical world or even take the form of
small 2D stickers (patches) that can be placed on any object.
They have the ability to cause wrong classification or false
detection, while they can also be used to hide all of the other
objects that are around them (even pedestrians). However,
despite their success, such attacks are usually applied in the
white-box settings, and, generally, show low transferability to
unknown (black-box) models.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss countermeasures against adver-
sarial physical attacks. We also discuss general methods, such
as adversarial training (AT), that are applied to mitigate the
effects of on-signal attacks, and their adaptation to physical
attacks is straightforward.
A. Ultrasonic and RADAR sensors
A method against spoofing and jamming attacks can use
each ultrasonic sensor to separate spoofed echoes from real
7ones and report the real distance (resilient obstacle detec-
tion) [15]. Ultrasonic sensors transmit pings of the same signal
throughout their lifetimes and search for only the first echo.
Since there is no bond between a ping and its echoes, to detect
attacks and possibly reject spoofed echoes, a physical signal
authentication is achieved by shifting the signal parameters
through a challenge-response scheme: first, by customizing
the ping signal, and, then, by correlating the received echoes
with the pings. In addition, a set of ultrasonic sensors can
also collaboratively detect an attack using a single-transmitter,
multiple-receiver sensor structure for resilient obstacle detec-
tion and attacker localization [15]. These approaches can be
also adapted for RADAR sensors.
B. GPS
Detection mechanisms may defend against attacks on the
location, time, and Doppler shift parameters [23]. For a given
parameter, the receiver first collects data during periods of time
that are in normal mode (training data). Then, based on the
normal-mode data, the receiver predicts the future values of
the parameter and compares the predicted values with the ones
obtained from the GNSS. If the difference with the predicted
values exceeds a selected threshold, the receiver deems itself
to be under attack, and all PVT solutions are discarded.
Two more spoofing countermeasures are described in [16].
The first one focuses on the latency between the spoofing
and original data bitstreams, where the receiver looks for a
data bit sign change between consecutive accumulations at
the coarse acquisition code-length interval. If a sign change is
detected anywhere other than at an expected data bit boundary,
the target receiver raises a flag. The second one focuses on
detecting the vestigial authentic signal. The receiver copies
the incoming digitized front-end data into a buffer used only
for vestigial detection and selects one of the GPS signals being
tracked, removes it from the data in the buffer, and performs
acquisition for the same signal (the same pseudorandom noise
identifier) on the buffered data. These steps are repeated for the
same GPS signal, and the results are summed non-coherently
until a probability of detection threshold is met. If a significant
vestigial signal is present in the data, this technique will reveal
it.
Finally, real-time GNSS spoofing detection can be achieved
by processing beat carrier-phase measurements from an an-
tenna pair [24]. Considering a spoofed and a non-spoofed
signal model, the observed differential beat carrier phases
are fit to either of the two models, and the estimates (along
with their associated fit error costs) are used to develop a
spoofing hypothesis test. Then, real-time spoofing detection
can be achieved through a switched-antenna version of the
two-antenna system that determines a single-differenced beat
carrier phase. Such a system can use a radiofrequency (RF)
switch between the two antennas, a single RF front-end, and
a single receiver channel per tracked signal.
C. LiDAR
Countermeasures can be applied at the hardware or at the
software level. At the hardware level, using multiple LiDAR
sensors of different wavelengths, which collaboratively pro-
vide the scanned information, makes it harder for the attacker
to manipulate every signal at the same time [10]. At the
software level, an option is to (non)-predictably skip certain
emitting pulses, which is similar to varying the scan speed. If
the system notices a response that corresponds to a skipped
pulse, then this is an indication of a possible attack. Another
option is to shorten the pulse period, which consequently
reduces the attack window. However, lowering the pulse period
also shortens the range of the sensor.
Defenses for DNNs can operate at the AV system, sensor,
or machine learning model levels [18]. At the AV level, by
studying the spoofed 3D point clouds, it can be observed
that points from ground reflection are clustered into obstacles
due to the information loss introduced in the pre-processing
phase. Mapping a 3D point cloud into a 2D matrix results in
height information loss, which facilitates an attack. To mitigate
this effect, the ground reflection can be filtered out in the
pre-processing phase, or, to reduce the information loss, the
point cloud should not be transformed into an input feature
matrix. At the sensor level, similarly to [10], a possible defense
consists of adding some randomness in the LiDAR pulses: by
firing a random grouping of laser pulses at each cycle, an
attacker would not know which reflections the sensor would
be expecting. Finally, at the machine learning model level,
an option is to perform adversarial training that, as we will
discuss later, improves the robustness of DNN-based systems
against adversarial attacks.
D. Camera
Increasing the robustness of DNN-based vision systems
against APs is a very challenging and widely studied problem.
We focus here on the tasks of image classification and object
detection.
Most defenses are for specific or weak attacks (and, thus,
stronger attacks can bypass them [25]) or just obscure the
model (gradient masking), rather than making the classifier
robust against all attacks [26]. A defense that is empirically
robust against all designed attacks is adversarial training (AT).
AT aims to train robust models rather than defend against
specific attacks: instead the model being trained only with the
original (clean) data, it is trained along with the adversarial
examples. AT has not been studied for physical APs yet, and
we, therefore, provide here the results for on-signal attacks.
Adaptation to physical APs is straightforward.
Formally, for a signal x ∈ Φ ∼ X , we define a set of
allowed perturbations Sv ⊆ Φ that formalizes the manipulative
power of the attacker; that is, as described in Section I,
the distortion caused by gv shall not considerably change or
destroy the information of the signal. Assuming data targets
y ∈ Y , a loss function L, and model parameters θ ∈ Rp, the
goal of AT is to solve the following minimax problem [27]:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼(X ,Y)
[
max
v∈Sv
L(gv(x), y,θ)
]
, (2)
which corresponds to learning a model using signals (adversar-
ial examples) that maximize the adversarial loss of the model.
8For the simple case of the MNIST image dataset [28], AT
is effective since the adversarial accuracy of the model (the
accuracy of the model when given adversarial examples as
inputs) remains close to 90%, without a significant impact
on the accuracy with clean examples, which is almost 98%.
For the slightly more complex CIFAR-10 [29] image dataset
though, the adversarial accuracy is almost 52%, while the
clean accuracy drops to almost 80%. Robustness is, at the
moment, at odds with accuracy [30], [31]: to increase robust-
ness one might have to sacrifice accuracy. In addition, the cost
of computing adversarial examples for the whole training pro-
cedure is very high, especially for high-dimensional datasets
such as ImageNet [32].
However, as AT decreases the curvature of the decision
boundaries of the classifier [33], a regularization term can
be added to the training loss to impose smoothness. The
minimization of this loss during training produces results
comparable to AT on MNIST and CIFAR-10 but much faster.
Moreover, a fast AT process [34] updates both the model
parameters and image perturbations using one simultaneous
backward pass, thus, with almost no additional cost to natural
training, resulting in ImageNet models with around 44%
adversarial and 65% clean accuracy.
For the task of object detection, the authors in [35] focus on
the design principles of existing adversarial attacks; an attack
to a detector can be achieved with variants of individual task
losses or their combinations (localization and/or classification),
and, in fact, adversarial attacks dedicated to one of the tasks
can reduce the performance of the model on the other task.
Exploiting these interactions between different task losses,
they generalize AT from classification to detection to form a
new minimax training scheme, which combines task-oriented
adversarial examples that maximize the adversarial loss of
the detector. This scheme improves by 20-30% both the
adversarial classification accuracy and the adversarial object
detection accuracy, which is the ratio between the correctly
detected objects and the actual total number of objects.
V. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
In this section, we summarize the findings from the eval-
uation of the adversarial attacks and countermeasures, and
identify four main research directions toward designing robust
sensing for autonomous driving systems.
A. Evaluation
The evaluation of adversarial attacks has been limited to
specific sensors or to machine learning models. When the
decision process is based on machine learning models, many
attacks are evaluated on a few models or on similar archi-
tectures, and/or with models trained on the same or similar
datasets. The corresponding evaluation is, therefore, limited,
as an attack that works well on a given dataset and architecture
might not generalize.
In fact, increasing the variability of the datasets and ar-
chitectures is important to evaluate the transferability of the
attack, since the generated adversarial examples might not
transfer to models of different configurations. Also, most
methods operate under white- or gray-box settings, which are
unrealistic, as an attacker might not have (full) knowledge
of the underlying sensory systems or the machine learning
models. To satisfactorily evaluate the robustness of AVs to
adversarial perturbations, it is desirable to design attacks in
black-box settings that are invariant to physical transforma-
tions, such as rotations, changes in viewing angle, and illumi-
nation variations. Simulators provide a promising direction to
test a wide variety of situations [36].
B. Fusion
While adversarial vulnerabilities of individual sensory sys-
tems have been thoroughly investigated, the effect on fused
signals is still not studied. In adversarial settings, determining
the modalities that contribute more to incorrect inferences
could provide new insights on how the information provided
by the non-adversarial sensors can support the systems and
help them to remain robust (adversarial robustness through
signal fusion). Moreover, from the perspective of the robust-
ness of the fused signal, the consideration of multi-modal
adversarial methods (attacking the fusion itself) is an exciting
research area that could open new directions in understanding
vulnerabilities in adversarial settings. It is, therefore, desirable
to study the effect of each individual sensor (under adversarial
attacks) to the fusion-based decision-making process.
C. Adversarial Training
AT has been mostly studied for image classification and
object detection, especially for on-signal APs. AT is a general
framework that can also be exploited to achieve robustness
against any type of AP (e.g., patchbased), including phys-
ical APs, by replacing on-signal adversarial examples with
physical adversarial examples. Moreover, the principles of AT
are applicable to any sensing modality when the underlying
system is a machine learning model. However, current versions
of AT schemes might saturate to some sub-optimal solution,
which could explain the increasing gap between adversarial
and standard accuracy [30]. Finally, it is also important to
focus on the dynamics of AT and explore how and why it
improves adversarial robustness [33].
D. Robustness
When evaluating the robustness of deep models against
adversarial attacks, it is not only important to ensure that
the selected attacks are strong (to avoid overfitting to weak
attacks [25]), but also to test the models using gradient-
free black-box attacks [37] to ensure that the models are
actually robust and that the gradients of the models are not
just obfuscated (gradient masking), which gives a false sense
of robustness [26].
Ultimately, a key question is to determine why APs exist.
Their existence is expected to be due to a combination of
causes related to the data, the architecture, and the train-
ing/learning scheme. With AT, robustness is an effect of
the modified data and learning scheme. When studying the
architectures, increasing the capacity of the model seems to
9help AT to increase robustness [27]. Important open questions
include the following. What would be the effect of other
network elements (e.g., the size of the learned filters)? What
are the interactions of all of these entities that cause (or
can prevent) such adversarial vulnerabilities? In that sense,
for building and deploying safer systems, instead of black-
box ones, more transparent models that allow us to interpret
and explain their functionalities and reasoning are certainly
desirable. Understanding how these systems work might, in-
deed, shed light on the underlying causes of their adversarial
vulnerabilities.
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